ASSEMBLING THE ETHNIC VIOLENCE PUZZLE FOR ABKHAZIA
Introduction
Ethnic wars and conflicts have become a common topic. Ethnic groups have been fighting for their independence from a dominant, often also repressive ethnic group. Kosovo succeeded in achieving this goal on February 18th as countries such as United States finally recognized Kosovo’s year-long pleading. This, however, is also seen by many as a dangerous precedent, which could cause old and new ethnic conflicts to arise. Following the Kosovo recognition, a number of ethnic groups have expressed their desire to become independent as they hope the international community will now accept their plea for self-determination.
Abkhazia has presented its appeal for independence to the UN and other international bodies on the March 7th, 2008. It is an autonomous region in Georgia, which has been struggling to gain independence long before the breakup of the Soviet Union. International organizations have, however, perceived Abkhazia to be an integral part of Georgia. The Abkhazes and Georgians have already seen a violent conflict as a result of their contradicting demands and responses, when on July 23rd 1992 Abkhazia declared its independence from Georgia.
Myriads of questions rise in similar conflicts when the two sides are known to have coexisted side by side for centuries. Something must have, however, changed for the two sides to suddenly perceive each other as ancient enemies. In order to determine what caused ethnic conflict in Abkhazia to escalate into violence, it is crucial to ask the right questions and then follow evidence which may or may not give us a complete explanation. What were the circumstances (political, economic, and cultural) that opened the window of opportunity for political entrepreneurs to use the “ethnic card”? What were their motivations in Abkhazia and Georgia? And why did they use ethnic identity instead of for example class or religion? Lastly, how did masses get mobilized and turn violent?
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, not all of its former republics and autonomous regions experienced violent ethnic conflicts similar to the one between Abkhazia and Georgia. Therefore, central to my question of what caused the violent conflict, will also be an attempt to determine why such conflict did not happen in all of the former Soviet republics.
Hypothesis
To proceed with assessing the evidence that will lead to a better understanding of the background in Georgia and Abkhazia, I propose that the outburst of ethnic violence in Abkhazia was a result of a combination of factors. First and foremost, institutionalized ethnicity became a legacy of the Soviet nationality policy, which was meant to facilitate mobilization of masses for industrialization. The legacy of ethnicity was well in place and free to be (mis)used by the elites later in the future if necessary. The future, as we know, was not too far ahead of them because the Soviet Union started crumbling after decades of a reign, at points both brutal as well as prosperous, as a result of Gorbachev’s democratization process glasnost in the eighties. The elites were more than eager to use the “ethnic card” as they had rightly feared that the dissolution of the union would have also terminated their stellar careers because “Gorbachev’s reform program…had involved from its inception a radical critique of the relationship of the ruling political party to the people that it ostensibly represented.”1 It was therefore necessary to gain popular support for their “national” causes, and hence to handpick the right myths and symbols which would best accommodate the elites’ desires to mobilize the masses.
Yet this would not have been possible without mobilization resources. Interestingly, in both scenarios, Russians seem to have left their trace. The Georgians inherited the Russian arsenal from the Soviet times, whereas the Abkhazes felt the Russian support (starting with Khruschev) more intensely after the breakup of the Soviet Union. External allies play a crucial role in aiding the groups, and consequently, “[t]he odds of violence increase…when alliances form across borders with cultural “brethren” who encourage violence.”2 According to Erine Jenne, this may be the case “even if the [host state] has credibly committed to protect minority rights”.3 In her analysis she casts doubts on the instrumentalist argument that the elites are always able to successfully mobilize popular support by playing “the ethnic card.”
She goes on further to challenge the security dilemma, claiming that the minority radicalization is not mainly a function of ethnic fears because the assumption that minorities act only upon defensive sentiments does not always hold as they may also focus on offensive motivations.4 I, however, argue that when processes that undermine or destroy institutions are present, there may actually be a link between the external support and security dilemma that is reinforced by the myth-symbol complex used by elites. These elites may create such myths because they might feel threatened, either internally by the counter-elites or externally by an outside enemy, or by a combination of the external support and counter-elites.
The Russian support of the Abkhazes, I argue, nourished the security dilemma on the Georgian side. On the one hand, Georgians feared losing the Abkhazian territory, while on the other hand they feared new-old subjugation under the Russian rule. The Georgians believed they had to ensure their control over Abkhazia, but most importantly, their ultimate goal was to save it and themselves from the Russians. A small loss might have followed with a bigger loss – losing Abkhazia would have resulted in losing the whole Georgia to Russia; therefore, it was thought wiser to avoid the loss of Abkhazia. These Georgian sentiments in return fostered security dilemma on the Abkhazian side, which saw its independence from Georgia as the only safe way toward a better and safer future.
In such circumstances, the elites consequently chose to exploit opportunities given by the democratization processes to save their threatened existence. Therefore, I agree with Mann when he argues that “democracy has always carried with it the possibility that the majority might tyrannize minorities, and this possibility carries more ominous consequences in certain types of multiethnic environments.”5 Especially regimes undergoing institutional change coupled with a loss of a strong authority as a result of democratization seem to be highly prone to the elites’ demands to retain their positions and authority, even when violence may be the only way to achieve it. The masses might see the elites’ claims as being valid, especially if they share the elites’ sentiments of security dilemma encroaching upon them from the enemy side.
In sum, the underlying assumptions of my hypothesis stem first from the Soviet nationality policy mentioned above, which politicized ethnic identity through institutions in government, administration, education, etc. Such institutions govern in all aspects of everyday life and are therefore crucial for effective control and functioning of a state. During the glasnost period these institutions were transformed, and many even replaced by new ones. Hence the “social contract” between the state and population, as designed by the communist ideology, was undermined. Institutional legacy, however, persisted and gave the local political entrepreneurs in both camps a solid base to fight from. The reason why they both felt obliged to unleash their fury originated from security dilemmas, which they both felt as they feared they would lose everything to their enemies.
On the one hand, this security dilemma was caused by the Soviet collapse itself as the elites lost their support from the Center.6 On the other hand, this security dilemma was further exacerbated for the Georgians by their fear of Russians, who seem to have favored Abkhazes throughout the century. Truly, Russians did, especially in the last couple of decades of the Soviet regime, openly support Abkhazes. Allocating more resources to them and giving them a higher share in administration, education, and other areas could have been seen as the signs of such support. Yet the Abkhazes comprised only 17.8% of the population in their own autonomous republic.7
This was destined to change once the Soviet regime started losing its direct control over the Georgian internal affairs in the fifties, and ever more during the glasnost period. The Georgians then finally felt ready to grasp the opportunity to ensure the territorial integrity of Georgia, including Abkhazia. These aspirations, Georgians becoming more nationalistic and the Russians losing their control over all of their constituents,8 consequently fostered security dilemma on the side of Abkhazes, who feared they would be never able to secede from Georgia unless they made an attempt during the democratization process.
Clearly then, the Russians as the outside ally of Abkhazia played a crucial role in this process of security-dilemma exacerbation. The external influence and the resources associated with it have been left as a consequence of the institutional legacy of the Soviet national federalism that had gradually favored Abkhazes and discriminated against the Georgians. The Center was, throughout most of its existence, able to keep the ever-more politicized ethnicities “on the leash.” However, the seeds of resentment toward each other and toward the Center, which seemed to have only favored the Abkhazian side, started fomenting before the Soviet Union had even come to existence, dating as far as 1801 when the Russians invaded Georgia.9
Soviet Nationality Policy
It is important to realize that the Abkhazes did not just wake up one day with an urgent desire to become independent. It took years for their consciousness to shape and for them to realize that what they wanted was a formation of a political entity independent of Georgia. In fact, it actually took someone else that had a deep interest in emphasizing the differences between the Abkhazes and Georgians while downplaying their similarities that had existed for centuries. Ironically, the Soviets themselves were responsible for pointing out such differences. In fact, they contributed to the awaking of the self-consciousness of not only Abkhazes and Georgians per se; all parts of the union were essentially driven toward the realization of their ethnic identity, different from that of the other union groups. This step was necessary because the Soviet regime had to rest its developmental strategy of industrialization and collectivization on a principle which would accommodate this strategy best but which would not, simultaneously, represent a breach to the communist ideology. The Soviet “nationality” policy based on the ethnicity principle was determined to be the best way to satisfy both conditions, and was thus gradually enforced upon the republics, regions, and even the smallest territorial units. The politicization of ethnicity was meant to help achieve the goals of social mobilization, while also reinforcing obedience toward the Center. New institutions were established to uphold this legacy, and they would later play one of the key roles in this ethnic conflict. Crawford also argues that
…in some places, identity politics came to define the logic of the political game…[a]nd in those places…the odds of violence were higher…The incentives and constraints offered by political institutions, and the strength of those institutions to follow through largely determined those odds.10
The new institutions in government, administration, education and other spheres were meant to give a monopoly over mobilization resources to the cadres who would further distribute them to the cultural elites. Simultaneously, the institutions were set up so as to limit primordial expressions through the cadres by giving them material gains in return for following these rules.
Ethnicity became central to the Soviet aspirations as it had seemed to be a readily available tool at hand for mobilization, different than for example religion or class, against which the communists essentially fought. It was, however, also a means of stratification of society evolving in form of titular nationalities and ethnic “minorities” in the respective republics. Other shortcomings of the nationality policy stemmed from the creation of cultural elites who soon became a threat to local cadres as their potential successors. Equally important was the fact that the Soviet regime strived to level off differences among its constituent republics and regions. Therefore, more developed groups did not receive as much resources as did the less developed ones.11 Roeder remarks that [i]n the 1989 budget only the five Central Asian republics were permitted to retain 100 percent of both the turnover and income taxes collected within their borders; they were to receive, in addition, subsidies ranging from 321 million rubles for the Tadjik Republic to 2.7 billion rubles for the Kazakh Republic. Conversely, the Latvian Republic was to retain the lowest proportion of its turnover tax (56.8 percent), and both the Armenian Republic (with 76.7 percent) and the Estonian Republic (with 79.4 percent) were to retain only slightly over three-quarters. This policy hence further contributed to the growing disillusion among the cadres in the more developed republics.
The Soviet Union with its center in Moscow does not seem to have realized the danger looming behind the institutionalization of ethnicity. Once the centre did not have enough resources to meet the increasing demands of ethnic cadres and cultural elites in the various republics, it began to lose its tight control over them. Roeder rightly notes that “[t]he Soviets might have achieved assimilation of many ethnic autonomous homelands, however, they opted for politicization of their ethnicity which made them even more distinct from the Russians and others.”12 Alienation was thus ever-more perpetuated by the Russians in spite of their dream for homogeneity in all its constituting parts. Institutions, their organization and their legacy in the process of transformation are often cited among the first proposed underlying causes of ethnic violence.
Institutions in the Soviet Union were based on the principle of politicized ethnicity, therefore the mobilization resources were also granted based on this principle. The representation of titular nationality and “minorities” in the Party and at the republic level was not proportionate though. Consequently, the competition among various political identities fostered animosity between the titular Georgian nationality and ethnic “minorities” such as the Abkhazes as they became an autonomous republic within Georgia in 1931.
The Soviet system was not egalitarian and according to Crawford, “preferential political institutions themselves can have the effect of intensifying and even actively creating political groups that legitimate identity-based political struggles and the allocation of benefits.”13 This point is valid in the case of Georgia and Abkhazia, where the institutions were also organized to give preference to the political identity based on ethnicity. The resources were allocated based on this principle and the ethnic “minorities”, which were made politically relevant, were not treated equally. Consequently, the autonomous regions followed the discriminatory practices just as the union republics did against them in regions where they only comprised minorities.
Abkhazes Getting Closer to Russia
The minorities’ aspirations were growing and to help their cause they needed more resources, therefore someone who would supply them with those. The opportunity to initiate or strengthen ties with outside allies was given after Stalin’s and Beria’s rule was over in the fifties. Stalin’s reign was at the time heavily criticized by the new central government and Suny explains well what followed next: From 1953 the new authority of the party, combined with Khrushchev’s policy of economic decentralization, increased the power of local parties in the national republic…in the hope that the local parties would be able to gain regional sources of support and provide stable government in the peripheries. A policy of indirect rule through dependent local elites replaced the old Stalinist system of direct control from Moscow.14 The Abkhazes thus gradually improved their relations with Moscow although they still received a lower share of investment per capita than did the Georgians.15 When the demands were raised for a more equal allocation of resources, Abkhazia could not have agreed on a change unless the same change first occurred at the republic level of Georgia. This, however, was even less attainable as the Krushchev’s decentralization gave an opportunity to reassert the titular nationalities’ control in their respective territories. In this period “[n]ational autonomy in Georgia had come to mean, on the one hand, resistance to central Russian authorities and, on the other, the exercise of local power against the unrepresented local minorities,”16 and the Abkhazes felt this pressure instantly.
Moscow clearly wanted to implement a gradual reform throughout the whole union but it loosened its control too much to be able to ensure the elite cadres would remain loyal to her. It was, however, impossible to implement serious economic change without a certain degree of decentralization. Leonid Brezhnev decided to reverse this path backwards after succeeding Khruschev, and refused to continue undertaking similar reforms. This decision further exacerbated economic downturn by the late 1970s, and hence weakened collective farm system.17 A growing “underground economy” that was fostered by corruption and bribe-taking through personal ties and clientele in Georgia was another contributing factor in the weakening. In such situations, as MacFarlane and Khutsishvili claim “unaccustomed insecurity and disappointed expectations favored the politicization of ethnicity.”18 It could also be added here that the Georgian and Abkhazian elites exploited the growing dissatisfaction among their respective populations. The elites on both sides had, on the one hand, gained a lot of power but on the other hand, they constantly needed to ensure this power through popular support, which was better achieved if the population felt grievances. The target for the Georgians thus gradually became the Russians and their favored allies such as the Abkhazes.
Derluguian notes that “[t]ensions between the Abkhazes and Georgians began to intensify as the Abkhazian elites gained increasing privileges [from Moscow] and the Georgian population experienced increasing discrimination.”19 Moscow’s influence can also explain Abkhazia’s success of achieving the status of an autonomous republic by 1945 within Georgia although the Abkhazes were in fact a minority in their own autonomous republic. As he further argues, “[t]wo factors – Moscow’s recognition of the Abkhazian language as one separate from Georgian and its policy of preferential treatment for Abkhazian peasants – both reinforced…separate political identity [as well as] increasing tensions with Georgia.”20 For Derluguian it was not only the politicized ethnicity, the legacy of the institutional preferences, discrimination toward the titular nationalities and minorities but mainly the Russian discrimination against the Georgians and the Russian support of Abkhazes that is crucial in explaining the violent outcome between Abkhazia and Georgia.
Security Dilemmas Exacerbated
The institutionalized distinctions between the Georgians and Abkhazes, coupled with the ongoing preferential treatment from Moscow, further contributed toward security dilemma and animosity in form of the exclusionary nationalism. Hence it seems plausible that “Georgia’s violent passage from Communist Party rule through civil and ethnic war to political disintegration was largely a by-product of a virulent, exclusivist nationalism that fragmented the country into warring ethnicities and social groups.”21 Admittedly, the institutions legacy of politicization of one ethnicity over another in one place and the very opposite in another part of Georgia might very well foster such exclusivist policies, making thus both sides dissatisfied, even threatened and willing to change the situation to their advantage. They may then opt for the use of violence, as they might see it as the only means to achieve the change and to ensure their security.
Still, the security dilemma and external support are necessary but not sufficient variables that explain the rise of violent conflict in Abkhazia. Clearly there must be an opportunity which allows masses and elites to fight for their ever-more emphasized identities and to follow their identities further to achieve their goal of self-determination. Therefore, a window of opportunity is necessary for dormant ethnic feelings and political incentives to evolve into a violent conflict and at this point it is also crucial to identify the actors who would favor a violent outcome.
In the Abkhazian and Georgian case it was clearly the whole population that was over the decades influenced by the Soviet nationality policy. People came to see themselves as belonging to a certain ethnic group because through the means of cultural identity they were either favored, discriminated against, or both. At the beginning it was the cultural elites, supported by the local communist cadres, who mobilized the population for their cause, which in most cases represented the determination to improve, maintain or advance their positions in their respective regions. It is, however, still “[w]ithin limits [that] elites can choose among the repertoire of available identities and discourses to promote interethnic peace or exacerbate conflict.”22 In this case it were two distinct ethnic identities, and both the Akbhazian and Georgian political entrepreneurs, as well as the cultural elites who spurred the conflict once the window of opportunity was open.
A Window of Opportunity for Abkhazes and Georgians
The question about what type of an opportunity was offered to elites to draw the masses on their side against the “other” remains unclear. First of all, institutions and their legacy have to be always present in the answer because “the odds of violence increase in those countries where ethnicity and religion were historically most politicized and where old institutions that perpetuated the political relevance of cultural identity collapsed.”23 One puzzle of the story has already been identified, i.e. politicized ethnicity of the Georgians and Abkhazes. Furthermore, institutions were established and must have been coupled with another element(s) which account(s) for the rise of violence because institutions are an independent variable in this puzzle. As Crawford argues “[c]ultural violence is not only a function of institutional weakness, but also results from a confluence of institutional legacies and current incentives, openings for cultural conflict that emerge in institutional transformation and overall institutional strength.”24 The apparatchiks in the union were too accustomed to their free will, and were thus refusing demands to expose themselves to a critique and transparency. The elites in Georgia and Abkhazia thus saw favorable conditions during the institutional transformation to reflect the threats they felt and advance their causes against their “enemy” even through the means of violence if necessary.
Identifying opportunity is thus the key to determine when a conflict turns violent. There are a number of authors who essentially use the same argument to explain the window of opportunity; however, they seem to emphasize different aspects which link to this opening. In the case of the Soviet Union and its republics this opportunity was caused by the democratization processes of glasnost.
Before talking about democratization, it is essential to define the term and any other broad terms this process might be associated with. The definition of democratization is an easy one as it signifies a process leading to democracy. The meaning of the term democracy is, however, not as clear. I borrow the one used by Snyder as he asserts that [i]n mature democracies, government policy, including foreign and military policy, is made by officials chosen through free, fair, and periodic elections in which a substantial proportion of the adult population can vote; the actions of officials are constrained by constitutional provisions and commitments of civil liberties…Freedom of speech, freedom to organize groups to contest elections, and reasonably equitable representation of varied viewpoints in the media are presumed to be preconditions for a free and fair election.25 This definition does not seem to include economic liberalization and globalization while some other authors’ definitions include these two aspects as well. For example Crawford asserts that “violence erupts most vociferously where secular economic decline, neoliberal economic reforms, and institutional transformation have broken old “social contracts”26, such as the ones that guaranteed one ethnicity’s privilege over the other ethnicities.
In the Soviet Union institutionalized favoritism and discrimination based on the ethnicity principle had left a legacy for later generations to hold onto it when the uncertain transition period came. The legacy was even clearer once the democratization arrived with Gorbachev. Glasnost brought insecurity and threat to the people’s minds because the “social contract” guaranteed by the state and institutions was falling apart and made the people feeling insecure about their future. The ideology came into question and with it also the rest of population which had followed this ideology for decades. Suddenly it was not right to think the way the elites had thought before glasnost. The elites were the first ones threatened as their posts could have been taken and replaced with new elites, loyal to new regime and ideology along with new institutions. The elites’ past could have in fact compromised their future, now when the system was becoming more transparent and democratic. The masses too were left in a vacuum that separated the “old” way of life and the “new” one. Therefore one had to adjust quickly to new conditions and hence often also forget about the old conventions. Fear that the other side might take over one’s property and harm the closest members of family is a strong incentive that nurtures the need to strike first. Therefore, elites and masses drew upon the fact deeply embedded in their everyday lives – their ethnicity.
The application of glasnost seems to have triggered ethnic violence in Georgia and Abkhazia but it is contrary to what Snyder asserts that “[m]ass nationalism is rarely well developed before democratization. More commonly, it rises during the earliest phase of democratic change. Beforehand, politics is a matter for elites.”27 In Georgia and Abkhazia the mass consciousness about their identity had long been fostered through the Soviet nationality policy. The circumstances associated with glasnost undermined the social contract that the Soviet institutions were set up to uphold. But since the elites now felt even more endangered by the other ethnic group within Georgia, they believed they could reverse the democratization process to their advantage even if it was to turn violent. The opportunity offered by glasnost was very favorable to their aspirations, as they could use it to arouse the fears of extinction in the masses on both sides.
Crawford goes further and sees the core problem of glasnost in the introduction of market economy and globalization because “economic liberalization and globalization can threaten to change the terms of the social contract within these institutions, thus creating political “space” for the appeals of ethnic and sectarian political entrepreneurs and their offers of new social contracts.”28 Only strong states can bear the pressure of the free market’s invisible hand. However, Crawford does not go further to explain how masses relate to the new and abstract theory of capitalism, which they had fought against thoroughly until that point. Her thesis is partially contradictory to Derluguian’s who thinks that “it was at the pinnacle of Gorbachev’s democratization that Moscow finally resolved to use coercion instead of the usual gratuitous pacification of Georgian-Abkhaz ritualized clashes.”29 For him it is not economic liberalization that played a significant role within the Georgian state but the outside influential force of the Russians and their support of the Abkhazes both before and after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The Missing Part of the Puzzle?
There seems to be a better set of explanations which accounts for more than just a transition period brought about by Gorbachev, and external support. MacFarlane, Snyder as well as Kaufman contest, on the one hand, that the political opportunity was opened by glasnost, and “provided space for the articulation of national chauvinist ideas, and to some extent fostered an incentive structure in the region conducive to elite manipulation of national myths.”30 As Kaufman alternatively argues, “[t]he motivating force was the powerful symbolism of statehood [as envisaged by the elites].”31 Masses needed to be constantly reminded about what they were fighting for. In order to draw the two populations on their elites’ side, the political entrepreneurs deployed the most potent tool available, which Kaufman labels as the myth-symbol complex.32 Both sides built on the myths and symbols that best represent their respective ethnic identity. They drew on examples from history which were subsequently evoked emotionally laden ethnic resentments against the other group. Hence, it was instrumentalism that dictated the use of ethnicity, in order to achieve the aspirations of the competing sides, because ethnicity was readily available to grasp and potent for mobilization.
The Georgian mythology emphasized Russian invasion of Georgia from 1801 until 1918 when Georgia became independent for a short while until 1921 when it was again annexed to Russia. Georgians feared Russian domination, which, as they believed, was meant to annihilate Georgians through assimilation. The Georgians further claim that Abkhazia was in the past a part of Georgia and in addition, that “the ancient “Abkhazians” were actually a Georgian tribe." 33 Abkhazes do not support such claims but on the contrary, maintain that their ancestors ruled in the area. They admit that they did unite with Georgia, but that this unity was under control of the Abkhazes and not Georgians. The Abkhazes further blame Georgians, who in 1931 with the help of Stalin and Beria, turned Abkhazia into an autonomous region dependent on Georgia.
During the glasnost period Georgian elites embraced slogans such as “Georgia for the Georgians,” “The Soviet Union is the Prison of Nations,” and furthermore evoked fears of extinction as they “warned about the “expansionism” of other ethnic groups and the “problem of physical survival” of the Georgian people, and demanded secession from the Soviet Union and the independence of Georgia.”34 Abkhazes too started utilizing historical symbols such as commemoration of the nineteenth-century Mohajirstvo to arouse feelings of cohesiveness among the population. The fears of extinction were exacerbated for example through the policies advocated by the Georgians which were supposed to restrict non-Georgians to no more than two children per family. 35 The Abkhazes felt themselves then rightly to be the victims of the Georgian chauvinism and hence saw their mobilization as the only counterforce against the Georgian aspirations. Both sides were thus ready to sacrifice their lives for their respective causes once they believed there was no other way to resolve the conflicting issues.
Conclusion
There are still questions associated with the democratization processes that need to be assessed in order to determine the exact conditions under which the transition evolved into a violent conflict between the Georgians and Abkhazes. Yet, I do believe that democratization process coupled with external support from Russia, fostered security dilemmas on both Georgian and Abkhazian sides and thus now form the underlying cause of violence in the Abkhazian territory.
Democratization, on the one hand, threatened the elites on both sides as well as their positions and their future political existence because this process was aimed to make the elites’ future functioning more transparent and the past one accountable, as its base had over time become only bribery and corruption. On the other hand, the Russians played the key role in exacerbating security dilemma on the Georgian side by aiding the Abkhazes. The Georgians saw this support strategic and only as a prelude to the Russian aspirations of taking over Georgia again. Therefore, the Georgians could not have left Abkhazia secede but had to maintain it under their control. The Abkhazes understood the Georgians sentiments, and the Georgian security dilemma in return exacerbated Abkhazian fears that they would not be able to achieve their independence from Georgia.
The mobilization of masses on the respective sides was therefore necessary for the elites to win over the enemy. The Georgians inherited material resources from the Russians while the Abkhazes became in favor of a constant influx of resources from Russia. Furthermore, the masses would only get mobilized if they too felt threatened. The employment of myths and symbols was therefore necessary in order to succeed in this task.
Still though, all this would not have been possible without the Soviet ethnofederalism, which politicized ethnicity, and thus helped to emphasize the distinction between the Abkhazes and Georgians. This policy would then later ensure this legacy to be at the core of explanation as to why the elites made a use of ethnicity in the instable period and to why the masses saw themselves to be so radically different from the other groups within their union republic.
Bibliography
1. Crawford, Beverly. “The causes of Cultural Conflict: Assessing the Evidence.”
2. Crawford, Beverly. “The causes of Cultural Conflict: An Institutional Approach.”
3. Derluguian, Georgi M. “Abkhazia – A Summary of Ethnic Conflict” in Identity Conflicts.
Transaction Publishers; 2007
4. Derluguian, Georgi M. “The Tale of Two Resorts: Abkhazia and Ajaria before and
since the Soviet Collapse.” pp. 261-92, in: Beverly Crawford & Ronnie D.
Lipschutz (eds.) The Myth of "Ethnic Conflict: Politics, Economics, and "Cultural"
Violence. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998.
5. Derluguian, Georgi M. “How Adjaria Did Not Become Another Bosnia: A Study in the
Interplay of Historical Determination, Human Agency, and Accident in the Chaotic
Transition” in After the Fall by George Katsiaficas. Routledge: New York and
London. 2001
6. Jenne, Erine. “A Bargaining Theory of Minority Demands: Explaining the Dog that Did
not Bite in 1990s Yugoslavia.” International Studies Quarterly (2004) 48, 729-754
7. Kaufman, Stuart J. Modern Hatreds. Cornell University Press: Ithaca and London.
2001
8. MacFarlane. Democratization, Nationalism and Regional Security, and Regional
Security in the Southern Caucasus. Government and Opposition, Vol. 32, No. 3
(Summer 1997), 399-420
9. MacFarlane, Neil; Khutsishvili, George. “Ethnic Conflict in Georgia” in Ethnic Conflict:
Religion, Identity, and Politics. 2002
10. Mann, Michael. The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing. New
York: Cambridge University Press. 2005
11. Roeder, Phillip. “Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization.” World Politics. Jan.1991
12. Snyder, Jack. From Voting to Violence. W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.; 2000.
13. Suny, Ronald Grigor. Provisional Stabilities: The Politics of Identities in Post-Soviet
Eurasia. (Winter, 1999-2000).
14. Suny, Ronald Grigor. The Making of the Georgian Nation. Indiana University Press,
2nd Ed. 1994