Venkat Balasubramani recently posted on Eric Goldman’s blog about a series of cases concerning Facebook friendships and posts and whether they can serve as an appropriate basis for recusal. The takeaways? Mere relationships are irrelevant, but posts which convey an impression of influence outside the courtroom may suffice.
Clore v. Clore, 2013 WL 3242821 (Ala. Civ. App. June 28, 2013) – Recusal denied by appellate court as moving party offered nothing more than “bare status of the parties’ daughter as a friend of the judge.”
The trial court offered an interesting tidbit as well stating, “[Facebook] is a social networking site where the word ‘friend’ is used [in a way] that doesn’t have anything to do with the way before this Facebook.com ever existed- the way we used the word ‘friend’…”
Lacy v. Lacy, 320 Ga. App. 739 (Ga. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2013) – Recusal of all judges denied in child custody case where non-moving party’s father was Chief Judge, and non-moving party wrote comment on moving party’s wall evidencing bias: “[J]udge [P]arrott and my dad ha[d] a meeting the week before our case and guess what you lost your kids.” Despite the appearance of improper influence, the court rejected the comment as evidence of facts requiring recusal saying the Chief Judge was not a party to the case, and the comment does not show that the judge “gleaned any personal knowledge of the facts involved…from [the meeting].”
Domville v. Florida – Recusal granted where a public display of friendship on social media conveyed an impression that a lawyer was in a position of influence over the judge. In many ways this is similar to the previous case, but with a different result. The author of the above-reference blog article opines possible explanations to distinguish the two cases.
For more information on social media law: http://www.kk-llp.com/144-Social-Media-Law
SOURCE:
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2013/07/judges_facebook_2.htm