Why do we do what we do? What motivates us? Are we goal oriented or hedonistic? A review of the seminal work on the topic by Phin Upham.
The study of motivation seems to be one of those topics where much progress is made, but no final answers are ever given. Indeed, it is even hard to understand what a “final answer” would mean. A model which correctly predicted all of our actions would be very implausible and radically reshape our notions of identity and free will. A model which carried much of the variance of action in certain prescribed areas of the world (business or intrinsic motivation), which is what the authors are attempting, would never be satisfying to all the different camps of motivationalists and the debate would simply continue on a finer level. One of the problems in the study of motivation is exactly this – there is no agreed upon goal or end to the project. The intrinsic nature of motivation is such that we can never get into peoples head and measure it directly, thus the experimenter and the subjects are forced to play with vagaries and uncertainties. Ultimately, I argue, the very structure of motivation makes it such that no one will ever fully capture its essence. Nevertheless, thinking about motivation seems to be one of the most useful and rewarding areas of psychology because even a partial understanding of this topic can radically shape the way we think about out lives and selves.
I have organized the essays, in ascending order, first by order of how comprehensive and complex their models are and then whether they deal with motivation or intrinsic motivation. To begin with, Locke’s (1968) Toward a theory of Task Motivation and Incentives lays out a foundation upon which many of the pieces rest – that motivation toward conscious goals are regulated by ideas. This is true on two levels, firstly the truistic level discussed in Week One that we create the entities in the world around us though in a subjective way. So we are motivated to act in the world according to how we believe the world to be on the most basic level (consciously and unconsciously). Secondly, our actions are mediated by our belief in the structure of the world (both conscious and unconscious). Setting high goals, Locke argues, helps us to accomplish a task better and faster; goals and intensions are, according to Locke, a vital part of the structure of motivation. His findings are generally based on a methodology of manipulating goals and intentions as the independent variables and measuring physical outcome as the output (be it reaction time, word length, or task effectiveness).
Locke teams up with Latham (1990) to create a deadly empirical duo who proceed to marshal significant past empirical evidence for Locke’s previously described theories on motivation. This idea that directed, goal-seeking behavior is crucial to motivation is quite intuitive but was often ignored by the behaviorist approach (the intellectual context of a work is crucial to understanding the debate in which it was a part, and thus the thrust of its arguments since even essays such as this one are goal directed!). This does add complexity to Locke’s previous theory by categorizing and differentiating between goals – proximal, distal, sub, etc. Importantly, they explain how external incentives help shape goals which in turn act as mediators to actions.
Victor Vroom (1964) has taken a very different tact than Locke. He has reviewed the literature of motivation, from hedonism to Hull to reinforcement, to Lewin and ending at cognitive models. This rich history of explorations is fertile ground for Vroom’s formalization of past understandings and constriction of a new model which synthesizes primarily the views of the cognitive researchers such as Atkinson, Tolman, etc. but includes a few others. He takes an a-historical approach, limits his theory to conscious action, and comes right and says that his model is untestable. He does, though, review the ways in which the aspects of the model might be tested.
The reading not turns to the important topic of intrinsic motivation. Intrinsic motivation is alternately defined as the “motivation you receive from doing the task itself” and as “the motivation which does not come from the goals or end of the task” or as “the motivation to understand and master a task.” Deci (1975) describes this question as the “why” question. Why we, they, or he is doing a task? After reviewing the mechanistic, organismic, cognitive, and humanistic theories of motivation and describing some of their assumptions and preconceptions. Deci says “many behaviors are motivated by other factors… a person who engages in a behavior in order to make money often has other motives for doing it, also. Hence he would probably do the same (though to a lesser extent) without receiving money.” (20). I am not sure what Deci means by this, perhaps he is circumscribing this range of actions, but on the face of it this seems an unsubstantiated and highly suspect statement. Why cannot we do something primarily for money, and why would we not do something completely different if no money were involved. Many people would no longer go to their jobs, where they go primarily for money, if no money were involved. It is rare to see people “volunteering” at for-profit businesses for the pleasure of work. Further, what does this add to his argument and does he need this assertion?
Nevertheless, like children, many of our actions are done without any specific goal in mind. Deci takes these actions, such as playing with a toy, exploring a cave, etc, to be intrinsically motivated. He reviews the literature on intrinsic motivation, including Drive theory which presents the interesting thesis that we act in response to internal “drives” that motivate us. Alternately, other theorists said we acted to reduce anxiety, which others hypothesized that we acted in order to achieve an optimal incongruity (do we all have unique levels of optimal incongruity?). Other theories argued for similarly mutually exclusive reasons for intrinsic motivation. Kagan’s reduction of uncertainly is particularly interesting. He says we explore and act to reduce uncertainly, including the uncertainty of future events and situations. Finally Deci attempts to integrate many of the theories by arguing that we act intrinsically in order to feel competent and self-determining. He shows us how this resolves the “optimal” problem (we sometimes act to increase stimulation sometimes to reduce it).
Deci, Connell, and Ryan (1989) research a real worked situation in which managers motivate their employees by encouraging self determination in their subordinates or not. They find some evidence that encouraging self-determination is a helpful strategy to increase the positive perceptions, affects, and satisfaction of their employees, and they show that it may be possible to train managers to do this. Lastly, they find an organizations cultural climate captures much of the variance in the previously mentioned feelings.
Lastly, Wood and Bandura (1989) construct a complex way of thinking about functioning. They construct a social cognitive model which hypothesizes that behavior, cognitive/perceptional factors, and the external environment create a triadic system of regulation, change and monitoring with which they hope to explain how we make decisions in the world. By studying complex decisions made by people who were running an imaginary corporation, they attempt to map and understand how this system works. Ultimately, this model does not explain motivation as much as it explains the way motivation (perhaps under cognitive/perceptional factors) might function over time in the real world.
Motivation and Intrinsic motivation seem to me to be two topics that can at least be partially highlighted by evolutionary psychology. None of the literature of the literature reviews in this weeks readings, though, delved deeply into this thesis. Deci did imply that there was a benefit to exploration and to competence. The ahistorical approach that many of the authors on the subject took also limited this approach’s applicability. How evolution might explain intrinsic motivation might be a project worth pursuing.
Motivation had to be purposeful (conscious0 and also that animals from rats to amoeba engaged in this behavior. Rats might be called conscious on some level, but amoeba? Animals seem to both engage in goal directed behavior and also intrinsic motivation. Animals of many different sorts exhibit both intrinsic and non-intrinsic motivation. An earthworm which has been trained to turn left to receive food will still turn right on in twenty times – why? Rats will explore their mazes – why? But if this is a conscious trait linked to understanding and all the other high-order functionings it is hard to understand how exactly this works. Are completely different mechanisms motivating these two very similar actions – this would seem strange, especially considering that children are perhaps the most intrinsically motivated of the human race but also can be seen as the least “conscious.” Hypothesis 1: higher order functioning is not necessary for intrinsic motivation. Hypothesis 2: intrinsic motivation is hard-wired into us from birth. Hypothesis 3: Animals and humans often pursue similar sorts or intrinsically motivated behavior in similar situations (exploration, etc).
Understanding the world around us and manipulating this world to increase inclusive fitness is a trait which is clearly beneficial form an evolutionary perspective. If we can explain how intrinsic motivation helps survival we can tentatively hypothesize it is evolutionarily hardwired and thus required a very different explanation than Deci’s, one that is non-cognitive but environmental. Exploration has its downsides – one might find a poison spider or waste energy for no purpose. But allowing ones environment to be unexplored leaves on ignorant of potential sources of food, potential weapons, and if danger ever did show itself it would make running and escaping particularly difficult (a rat who did not know its environment would simply run into a dead end and be eaten. Mankind has benefited from its curiosity and intrinsic motivation to play with fire and sharp stones in obvious ways. Reducing future uncertainly and gaining access to useful resources, then, should not causally linked to intrinsic motivation on a cognitive level but on an evolutionarily level.
Readings:
Vroom, Victor H. (1964). Work and Motivation. New York: John Wiley & Sons. Chapter 2 (pp. 8-28).
Locke, Edwin A. (1968). Toward a theory of task motivation and incentives. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 3: 157-189.
Locke, E.A. & Latham, G.P. (1990). A Theory of Goal-Setting and Task Performance. Prentice Hall. Chapters 1-2.
Deci, Edward L. (1975). Intrinsic Motivation. New York: Plenum Press. Chapters 1-2 (pp. 3-63).
Wood, R.E. & Bandura, A. (1989). Social cognitive theory in organizational management. Academy of Management Review, 14: 361-384.
Deci, E.L.; Connell, J.P. & Ryan, R.M. (1989). Self-determination in a work organization. Journal of Applied Psychology, 74: 580-590.
Phin Upham has a PhD in Applied Economics from the Wharton School (University of Pennsylvania). Phin is a Term Member of the Council on Foreign Relations. He can be reached at phin@phinupham.com.