Out of Iraq

An exit strategy is chugging into view, but the US will need to embrace its softer side before it can get on board

 Lenny Small, the physically imposing and mentally feeble character in John Steinbeck’s “Of Mice and Men,” likes to play with soft, vulnerable things like bunny rabbits.  When a young woman allows him to stroke her hair, his fervour frightens her and she struggles to free herself.  Afraid of the consequences, Lenny holds her tight, and ends up strangling her dead.

            The comportment of the coalition forces in Iraq, led by and primarily consisting of the US military, calls to mind this tragic character.  They have consistently relied on their superior strength  to quiet rebellious factions.  But by disregarding legitimate grievances and failing to provide basic civil services in the first years of the conflict, the coalition committed to a military wrestling match with groups which could have been allies. 

            In the past year, Iraq has settled somewhat, allowing the coalition to loosen its stranglehold to a firm but tenuous grip.  Will they be able to leave Iraq in one piece, or will the country begin thrashing again?

            Professor Fawaz Gerges, an expert on international affairs and Middle Eastern studies at Sarah Lawrence College, asserts that the US presence is problematic in itself, as it provides extremist groups with ideological ammunition.  “The large majority of Arabs and Muslims do not view the American invasion of Iraq as a campaign or effort to promote democracy, but as a war, a crusade against Islam and Muslims,” he said.[1]  This majority includes populations under pro-western governments, like Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

            “The American military presence in Iraq has become part of the problem, and not part of the solution,” said Professor Gerges.  He proposed that the US withdraw, and fill the security vacuum with neutral Muslim states which would not encounter anti-western backlash.

            This option is highly unlikely, not only because it would signal an American defeat.  Even worse for the US would be to allow another nation to succeed where it did not – to be the cause, but not the solution.  More important than protecting national pride, the US has a moral responsibility to repair the damage it has inflicted in the past five years.      

            A light recently appeared at the end of the tunnel – the drop in violence since the surge, which can most reasonably be attributed to several factors beyond the rise in troop levels.  On the Shia side, Mahdi army leader Muqtada al-Sadr called a cease-fire in late 2007, and Professor Gerges suggested that the Sunnis’ Anbar Awakening Council had effectively “cut al-Qaida’s wings in Iraq”.

            These are significant advances, yet the light is still faint. Without reinforcement, it could easily be extinguished.  “Strategically, the predicament remains as complex as it was three years ago,” said Professor Gerges. “Unless you deal with the complex and deepening political crisis in Iraq, I don’t think you’ll succeed. Not only do you have the struggle between the Sunni and the Shia, you have multiple fault lines within the various communities.”

            Insurgency and terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman, who teaches at Georgetown University, agreed. “We have been good at the front end, creating the secure environment,” he said. “We’ve been doing less well at the political reform…We thought the hard part was stabilising Iraq, but it turns out it’s not.  The hard part is governance.”[2]

            Unrest among Sunni tribes continues to present a simmering danger  of renewed violence. Senior fellow at the RAND Corporation, David Gompert, considers these groups “essentially hostile to the US and the Iraqi government.”[3]  Until recently hotbeds of terrorist activity, Mr Gompert called their late cooperation “most effective”. But he warned that a relapse could cause the coalition the most trouble in terms of terrorism and consequent rises in insurgent activity.  

            By forging tactical alliances, such as with the Sunnis, the coalition has exacerbated ethnic and sectarian fragmentation.  In the ensuing chaos, Mr Gompert suggested that the opportunity for an effective counter-insurgency has been lost.  At this point, it would “require a huge amount of money that is unlikely to be invested”.  In any case, he advised: "To the greatest extent possible, US forces should yield responsibility to the Iraqi army, which is more legitimate in most parts of the country.     

            A RAND report[4] co-authored by Mr Gompert offered one key to the solution. “Insurgencies nearly always fail against governments that are representative, competent, and honest in the eyes of their citizens,” it stated. Of the current government in Iraq, Mr Gompert observed the opposite: “It is a completely divided political system.”

            The director of research at the Saban Centre for Middle East Policy, Kenneth M Pollack, concurred.[5]  “Despite the progress of the surge in the north, west, and centre of Iraq, the country’s central government remains a highly counter-productive force, one that seeks to advance chauvinistic Shia interests…at the expense of the country,” he wrote.

            The Iraqi government desperately needs a counter to the centrifugal forces pulling the country apart.  The International Crisis Group (ICG) emphasised in a recent report[6] the importance of a viable scheme for sharing oil revenues to unify the country.  Because the country derives the bulk of its budget from these revenues, “A transparent, efficient and equitable framework for the management of oil and gas wealth arguably is the most important building block of a new Iraq,” it said.

            However, passing a durable oil-sharing scheme is nearly impossible under the current Shia-dominated council of representatives.  Both the ICG report and Mr Pollack’s agreed that new elections to recalibrate the balance of power must take place before any real reforms can be negotiated.  The ICG recommended a multi-lateral conference, sponsored by the UN, to create a political compact palatable to the major constituencies and guaranteeing a fair share of power and resources.

            If this were achieved, it would go a long way to ensuring a viable post-surge Iraq. The second necessary element for stability is that Iraq provide for its own security, and a drawdown of US troops enjoys broad support.  Professor Hoffman summed up a common sentiment: “This can’t be an open ended commitment. They (Iraqis) are going to have to step up and take over sooner or later…otherwise they’ll be content to let us do the fighting for them.” 

           One of the coalition’s first and biggest mistakes must be amended before this can happen. 

Former administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority, L. Paul Bremer, disbanded the Iraqi army and civil service in May of 2003.  A Western diplomat attached to the CPA told Time magazine: “We made hundreds of thousands of people very angry at us, and they happened to be the people in the country best acquainted with the use of arms.”   [7]  

            Today, Iraq’s fledgling security forces are incapable of assuming the coalition’s role.  “More has to be done faster to build them up,” said Professor Hoffman. He recommended conscription as a possible solution. “This is how you build a nation, how you inculcate a common conception of the state,” he said. 

            Professor Hoffman viewed the Iraqi police force as more problematic, calling it a “disaster”. He explained: “We emphasise training the military, but you can’t have a stable, functioning society without an effective police force…We farm it out to private contractors who take, let’s say, motorcycle cops from Tennessee, who may be very good police officers in Tennessee. But the environment in Iraq is pretty different.”

            Furthermore, said Professor Hoffman, “Police forces are loath to let their best people leave.”  To address this shortfall, he advocated creating a special advisory corps comprised of members of the armed forces with experience as police officers.

            Echoing Professor Gerges’s call for assistance from Muslim states, more voices are urging regional cooperation as a pivotal ingredient in any formula for long-term success in Iraq.  The ICG report advocated engaging in “genuine regional diplomacy, including with Syria and Iran”  to maintain stability in Iraq during and after a US withdraw.

            This will be a hard pill for the Bush administration to swallow.  A leader remembered for his vociferous denouncement of Iran as part of an “Axis of Evil” will likely balk at the idea of appealing to that nation for assistance.  A recent article in the The Economist  suggested that these two players are far from cooperating, least of all on the question of Iraq.  

            “Iran’s government has fiercely denied the charges [of funding and training militant Shia groups in Iraq], refusing to take part in the next round of talks with American officials on security in Iraq until American troops stop killing innocent people in Sadr City,” the article stated. 8]  The antagonism could be cut with a meat cleaver.

            These three initiatives, electing a cooperative government, training capable security forces, and cultivating regional support for a common goal in Iraq, depend on each other for their success.  Because there is no obvious sequential order of execution, the task as a whole is greater than the sum of its parts.

“Large-scale military intervention can be seen as the result of a failed counterinsurgency strategy,” wrote the authors of the RAND report. Traces of any counterinsurgency strategy at all in the first four years of the Iraq War are hard to find. For too long, the coalition’s first and only reflex to insurgent activity was military, and it sent countless civilians running to the arms of sectarian groups and local militias.        

             The US must now assume the role of arbiter between the warring factions, a tall order for an administration which is more accustomed to flexing its biceps than its tongue. If a new awareness of the failed “strategy” of strength can make this drastic role reversal possible, the US may yet be able to leave Iraq without first squeezing the life out of it.