SCOPE OF PSYCHOLOGY
As we have already observed, recent writers commonly confine the
term psychology to the science of the phenomena of the mind. Thus
William James, probably the psychologist of widest influence during
the past twenty years, defines psychology as "The Science of Mental
Life, both of its phenomena and their conditions". ("Principles", I, 1).
Wundt’s definition is: "the science which investigates the whole
content of Experience in its relations to the Subject". ("Outlines", 3rd
ed., 3). Other writers describe it as, "the science of the facts
apprehended by our internal sense", or again, "the science of our
states of consciousness, their laws of succession and concomitancy".
The common feature of all these definitions is the limitation of the
scope of psychology to the phenomena of the mind directly
observable by introspection. In this view it is a purely positivist
science from which all philosophical problems are to be excluded, as
rigorously as from chemistry or geology. It is, in fact; la psychologie
sans âme. If such questions as the nature, origin, or destiny of the
soul are to be discussed at all, it must be, according to these writers,
not in psychology, but in some branch of speculation to be styled the
metaphysics or ontology of the human mind, and to be completely
isolated from science.
In direct contrast with this view is that ordinarily adopted by Catholic
writers hitherto. By them, psychology has usually been conceived as
one of the most important branches of philosophy. In their view it may
be best described as the philosophical science, which investigates
the nature, attributes, and activities of the soul or mind of man. By
soul, or mind, is understood the ultimate principle within me by which
I think, feel, will, and by which my body is animated. Whilst the soul
and the mind are conceived as fundamentally one, the latter term is
usually employed to designate the animating principle viewed as
subject of my conscious or mental operations; the former denotes it
as the root of all vital activities. By terming their branch of knowledge
a philosophical science, it is implied that psychology ought to include
not only a doctrine of the laws of succession and concomitance of our
conscious states, but an inquiry into their ultimate cause. Any
adequate study of the human mind, it is contended, naturally presents
itself in two stages, empirical or phenomenal psychology, and rational
or metaphysical psychology. Though conveniently separated for
didactic treatment the two are organically connected. Our
metaphysical conclusions as to the nature of the soul must rest on
the evidence supplied by our experience of the character of its
activities. On the other hand, any effort at thorough treatment of our
mental operations, and especially any attempt at explanation of the
higher forms or products of consciousness, it is urged, is quite
impossible without the adoption of some metaphysical theory as to
the nature of the underlying subject or agents of these states.
Professor Dewey has justly observed: "The philosophic implications
embedded in the very heart of psychology are not got rid of when
they are kept out of sight. Some opinion regarding the nature of the
mind and its relations to reality will show itself on almost every page,
and the fact that this opinion is introduced without the conscious
intention of the writer, may serve to confuse both the author and his
reader" ("Psychology", IV). Ladd, and others also, recognize the evil
of "clandestine" metaphysics when smuggled into what claims to be
purely "scientific" non-philosophical treatments of psychology.
Psychology is not in the same position as the physical sciences here.
Whilst investigating a question in geology, chemistry, or mechanics,
we may, at least temporarily, prescind from our metaphysical creed,
but not so – judging from the past history – when giving our
psychological accounts and explanations of mental products, such as
universal concepts, the notions of moral obligation, responsibility,
personal identity, time, or the perception of an external material
world, or the simple judgment, two and two must make four. The
view, therefore, of those philosophers who maintain that the intrinsic
connexions between many of the questions of empirical and rational
psychology are so indissoluble that they cannot be divorced, seems
to have solid justification. Of course we can call the study of the
phenomena of the mind, "Psychology", and that of its inner nature,
the "Philosophy of the Mind"; and we may treat each in a separate
volume. That is merely a matter of terminology and convenience. But
the important point is that in the explanatory treatment of the higher
intellectual and rational processes, it will practically be impossible for
the psychologist to preserve a philosophically neutral attitude. A truly
scientific psychology, therefore, should comprise:
A thorough investigation by introspective observation and analysis of
our various mental activities – cognitive and appetitive, sensuous and
rational – seeking to resolve all products of the mind back to their
original elements, determining as far as possible their organic
conditions, and tracing the laws of their growth;
Based on the results of this study, a rational theory or explanatory
account of the nature of the agent or subject of these activities, with
its chief properties.
-DR.NAVRAJ SINGH SANDHU
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