What is the purpose of society and its parts? Phin Upham discusses the theory of functionalism.
By attempting to explore/describe aspects of society through the lens of functionalism, one is explaining objects in society in terms of what roles they play. Talcott Parsons, in particular, is not so much dealing with the specifics of society in his piece “The Social System” so much as he is attempting to get under the skin of our social system and explain the necessary and sufficient pieces of society, both large and small, that are combined to make token (specific) societies. Nevertheless, one can analyze this society in terms of the interests and functions of its parts and find that Parsons’ analysis applies. Lukes’s piece on “Power: A Radical View” can be seen to serve as a beginning of a critical view toward functionalism. If people’s interests, i.e. desires and goals, are not only arbitrary, but sometimes manipulated, it becomes very difficult to wholly explain artifices in society as functioning to mediate between interests.
Talcott Parsons’s “The Social System” is a careful dissection and explication of social systems in terms of the “action frame of reference.” Parsons begins with the smallest possible social unit – the interaction of small groups of individuals. He sees when might be called “emergent” features to this level of complexity where social, cultural, and physical objects interrelate such that the individuals have a set of expectations about the future and shared values with the rest of the group. Parsons defines the basic elemental parts of the system (the “unit act” “actors”), the parts of identities they take on (“status-role”) and the groups they form (“classes” “organizations”). He differentiates between then (“power” “goals” “interests”) and sets up a general schema in which we can analyze differences in interests and identities (“pattern-variables”). Notice that so far he has not mentioned anything that would be strictly culturally specific; his goal is not to define Western societies, or America, but instead to speak of structures that MUST be true of any system involving multiple human agents.
As Parsons defines his terms and describes the parts of the social “system” his rhetoric becomes more and more mechanistic and abstract. For example, “A given actor, ego, then is within an ‘instrumental complex’ as it may be called, confronted with four major types of problems of the ordering of his relations with four major types of problems of the ordering of his relations to the significant alters” (72). Rhetorically, the introduction of terms such as “cathex” “disposal” “object” “relevant interest” serve a two fold function. Firstly, since he is able to define his terms as he proceeds, he is able to provide a universal agreement on what he is talking about which might not be as clear if he were to use more “hazy” terms which different people would define differently in different contexts. In addition to definitional clarity, Parsons is able to achieve the crucial end of defamiliarization through the introduction of mechanistic terms to describe organic action. By this I mean he is able to remove us sufficiently from our own perceptional bias such that we are able to understand and mentally manipulate our social surroundings on a theoretical and structural level. Parsons seems to be an extraordinary differentiator and abstract thinker. His essay on how school socializes us for society and serves the useful societal function of differentiation is a good example that his method of differentiation and integration is able to be usefully applied to specific institutions in specific societies.
Robert Merton’s essay “Manifest and Latent Functions” spends much of its time on definitions, attempting to, for example, define “function.” His general idea is that every standardized social or cultural form has some sort of latent (explicit) or manifest (hidden, not explicit) function. These functions can be functional (help make society more efficient or productive as a whole, perhaps) or dysfunctional (serve the interests of one subgroup at the expense of another or of the general society). Merton draws from a variety of examples to buttress his thesis. He uses examples, like Dirkheim, that are drawn form anthropological research of “primitive” societies. He also uses modern sociological examples (electric company) and natural experiments (political bosses). But no matter the example, there is some implication that for something to exist over time it must be serving a function. In the case of political bosses, they “presently fulfill some functions for these diverse subgroups which are not adequately fulfilled by culturally approved or more conventional structures.” This functionalism is criticized by Collins as not adequately recognizing the role conflict plays in society – that it is the interests of some group, often at the expense of another, that is being served not necessarily some positive (universal functionalism postulate) or -in its weak form- critical (indispensability postulate) societal function.
Readings:
Randall Collins, Four Sociological Traditions
Talcott Parsons, The Social System (New York: Free Press, [1951] 1964)
Talcott Parsons, “The School Class as a Social System.” Harvard Educational Review 29 (1959):297-318.
Robert K. Merton, “Manifest and Latent Functions.” In Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1968), pp. 73-138.
Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (London: Macmillan, 1974), pp. 9-64.
Phin Upham has a PhD in Applied Economics from the Wharton School (University of Pennsylvania). Phin is a Term Member of the Council on Foreign Relations. He can be reached at phin@phinupham.com
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